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Abstract 
A basic theory of electoral accountability is widely accepted by academic opinion: voters cause politicians to gain or lose 
office through periodic elections, thereby influencing policy through the threat of electoral sanction. Empirical studies 
run the gamut from findings of strong support for this theory, to mixed or conditional support, to weak or negative re-
sults. When electoral processes are analyzed in terms of two distinct causal linkages within a three-part chain of ac-
countability, however, positive findings are revealed as weaker than they appear while a compelling trend emerges to-
ward findings ranging from conditional to negative in the last two decades. This trend is visible in three topical areas—
economic voting, political corruption, and ideological congruence—and it holds for both presidential and parliamentary 
regimes as well as for a variety of electoral systems. The new electoral skepticism’s unsettling results and insightful 
methods may help to improve future research and reform efforts alike. 
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1. Introduction 
Widespread concern about “democratic deficits” in 
late-modern politics often responds to the power of 
unelected and unaccountable agents, whether gov-
ernmental, social, or economic. But what about elected 
but unaccountable agents? According to a sizeable 
body of research in political science, such a phenome-
non is no Frankenstein of the imagination but rather a 
normal feature of the democratic landscape. Increasing 
numbers of empirical studies in the last two decades, 
as well as theoretical reflections over a considerably 
longer period, suggest that periodic elections are poor 
vehicles of democratic accountability. How much truth 
is there in this suggestion? 
A deeply entrenched conventional wisdom, popular 
and scholarly alike, places an “electoral connection” 
(see Mayhew, 1974) between citizens and governors at 
the heart of democracy: the former are supposed to 
control the latter by rewarding them with electoral 
victory or punishing them with electoral defeat. On the 
other hand, the development of what might be called 
“electoral skepticism” over the last two decades has 
presented a broad front. Studies in the history of ideas 
have established that elections were understood in the 
formative years of republican and constitutional thought 
as supplanting popular power more than enabling it, 
and that other, non-electoral procedures of accounta-
bility have traditionally been preferred by democrats 
(Manin, 1997; Maloy, 2008, 2011; McCormick, 2011). 
Analysis of the empirical realities of modern elections 
has suggested that the conditions under which they 
could be interpreted as vehicles of accountability are 
rarely present, leading to a perceived need to substi-
tute specialized “accountability agencies” (Manin, 
Przeworski, & Stokes, 1999, pp. 50-51) or “horizontal 
accountability” (Schedler, 1999, pp. 23-25). 
Recent efforts to assess the state of our knowledge 
about electoral accountability, however, have over-
looked the trend toward electoral skepticism (Carson & 
Jenkins, 2011; Pande, 2011; Ashworth, 2012), or else 
have engaged it in relatively narrow institutional con-
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texts (Maravall, 2010). A cognitive gap seems to sepa-
rate optimists who ignore the grounds for skepticism 
and skeptics who take accountability deficits for grant-
ed and see little potential contribution from further 
study. My analysis attempts to bridge this gap by bring-
ing optimistic and skeptical studies into direct engage-
ment. Based on evidence from democracies around the 
world, including both presidential and parliamentary 
regimes as well as both pluralitarian and proportional 
electoral systems, I conclude in favor of electoral skep-
ticism across the board. Elections as we know them 
cannot provide immunity against serious deficits of 
democratic accountability, though they might remain 
socially valuable in other respects. 
Section 2 outlines an original conceptual framework 
for assessing electoral accountability empirically, based 
on the crucial distinction between two halves of a 
causal chain: the vote-sanction linkage and the sanc-
tion-policy linkage. Section 3 reviews recent empirical 
studies in three key areas of research: economic voting, 
political corruption, and ideological congruence. I then 
address in Section 4 specific problems with common 
methodological choices in studies of electoral accounta-
bility. My concluding section explains how better prac-
tices in designing empirical studies and interpreting their 
results can improve our understanding of where and 
how far electoral accountability can and does obtain. 
2. Conceptual Structure of Electoral Accountability 
The empirical realities of electoral processes, as of 
many political phenomena, are baroque, complex, and 
multidimensional—in a word, messy. Scholarly studies 
of elections are legion and necessarily reflect the mess-
iness of their subject, frequently framing their findings 
by using terms like “accountability,” “responsiveness,” 
and “representation” in rough-and-ready fashion. Know-
ing or saying everything there is to know or say is im-
possible, but imposing conceptual parameters on the 
field of study can at least enable us to aspire to con-
sistency in and clarity about the terms of analysis. 
The basic idea behind electoral accountability is 
that periodic elections should allow voters to reward 
and punish politicians for governmental conduct, 
thereby inducing politicians to engage in anticipatory 
behavior that is responsive to voters’ interests (Manin, 
Przeworski, & Stokes, 1999, p. 29). This idea must be 
distinguished from three related concepts: discursive 
accountability, intrastate checks, and responsiveness. 
First, the kind of accountability which is supposed to 
reflect the special role of elections in a democratic 
state involves more than discursive exchange or the 
circulation of information; it also involves sanctions. 
Elections serve this purpose because they are valued 
not only as an occasion for public debate (“accountabil-
ity” in the minimal, etymological sense) but also as a 
sanctioning mechanism (Mainwaring, 2003, pp. 12-14). 
Second, periodic elections are supposed to respect the 
concept of popular sovereignty by giving power to one 
set of people, voters, over another, politicians. In for-
mal terms, a hierarchic or “vertical” relation is set up 
between principal and agent (Moreno, Crisp, & Shugart, 
2003, p. 80), a relation that may overlap with but is 
nonetheless different from “horizontal” or “intrastate” 
checks between agencies of government (Kenney, 
2003, p. 50; Mainwaring, 2003, pp. 20-22). Third, re-
sponsive behavior by governmental agents may be 
considered the end, and accountability (i.e. vertical 
sanction) the means, of democratic elections. Electoral 
accountability is therefore not equivalent to democrat-
ic responsiveness but rather is meant to describe insti-
tutionalized relations of power that cause responsive-
ness (Ferejohn, 1999, p. 131). 
The distinction between accountability and respon-
siveness is particularly elusive. Because both are pieces 
of the broader puzzle of political representation, these 
two concepts are often tacitly conflated in the design 
and interpretation of empirical research (e.g. Kassow & 
Finocchiaro, 2011, pp. 1019-1023). Yet electoral sanc-
tion and responsive government are distinct phenome-
na, and either one may exist in the absence of the oth-
er. Thus voters may actually reward some politicians 
with electoral victory and punish others with electoral 
defeat without actually seeing public policy steered in 
responsive ways, while politicians may actually serve 
voters’ real or imagined interests without their political 
careers’ actually depending on that fact. Indeed some 
advocates of the “political economy” approach to elec-
toral studies now believe that elected politicians’ pro-
pensity to deliver responsive policy may be an inde-
pendent function of their “types” (i.e. responsive or 
otherwise) rather than of any pressures exerted on 
them while in office (see Ashworth, 2012). This is called 
a “selection” (or prospective) model as opposed to a 
“sanction” (or retrospective) model of electoral control. 
It helps to think of electoral accountability, then, as 
part of a chain of causal processes (cf. Powell, 2004, pp. 
97-99) within the larger phenomenon of political repre-
sentation, revolving around sanction as the distincitve 
middle term. In a formula, (a) periodic elections are sup-
posed to lead to (b) effective sanctions, which are in turn 
supposed to lead to (c) responsive government (see Fig-
ure 1). The vote-sanction linkage refers to accountability 
in the narrowest sense, while the sanction-policy linkage 
(ending in responsiveness) refers to the most significant 
causal ramification of electoral accountability. 
To be sure, it is helpful to avoid conflating the terms 
“accountability” and “responsiveness,” as the meta-
phor of a chain illustrates. Yet it would be odd to study 
one half of this causal chain without regard to the oth-
er. After all, ordinary citizens have common-sense rea-
sons for caring about policy outcomes and about their 
votes’ ability to affect those outcomes, and political 
scientists do in fact attempt to study both linkages in 
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tandem. As long as we bear in mind that these two 
distinct but related causal processes (or linkages) may 
present distinctive challenges for research, we can benefit 
from a critical review of recent empirical studies that ad-
dress either or both of these linkages in the chain. 
 
Figure 1. The Causal Chain of Electoral Accountability. 
3. Empirical Tests of Electoral Accountability 
This section will review findings in three major fields of 
study which typically address core questions of elec-
toral accountability: economic voting, corruption, and 
congruence. The review is not meant to be comprehen-
sive, since not every study within each field is designed 
to shed light specifically on the problem of electoral 
accountability, but it does capture the wide range of 
accountability results which actually exists in each lit-
erature, from positive to mixed to negative. Section 4 
will then develop a more systematic analysis of the 
conceptual and methodological strengths and weak-
nesses of empirical studies that substantially address 
electoral accountability through distinctive choices 
about data (see Tables 1 and 2). 
3.1. Economic Voting 
The literature on economic voting has tended to take 
the causal chain of electoral accountability whole, pur-
porting to measure not only the vote-sanction linkage 
but also the sanction-policy linkage. Typically some 
measure of electoral performance is used as the de-
pendent variable, with various measures of economic 
performance as independent variables. If good and bad 
economies lead to good and bad electoral results, re-
spectively, for incumbents or their parties, the quanti-
tative analysis is interpreted as confirmation that vot-
ers use elections to reward governments for good eco-
nomic times and to punish them for bad. In turn, elec-
tions may then be said to induce all politicians to de-
vote themselves to pursuing the voters’ more or less 
unanimous desire for prosperity. 
Before reviewing the empirical findings of this liter-
ature, it is important to notice the structure and limita-
tions of the typical research design. While electoral 
performance is used to measure sanctions in the mid-
dle of the causal chain, economic measures are used as 
proxies at the front and back ends. Good economic 
indicators are assumed to represent both satisfied vot-
ers at the front end and responsive government at the 
back end, leaving good electoral results for incumbents 
as the only logical connection in the middle. The possi-
bility that voters may be unhappy in good economic 
times or happy in bad economic times, or that econom-
ic performance may be unrelated to governmental 
conduct, is not contemplated in the basic research de-
sign. More precise studies of public opinion on the 
front end, and of economic policy-making on the back 
end, would therefore be needed for a tight causal ex-
planation to emerge from the quantitative results. 
Even under the simplistic assumptions of the basic 
research design, the collective verdict of economic-
voting studies has been mixed. Inconsistent early re-
sults (see Anderson, 2007, p. 274) led to a pivotal study 
(Powell & Whitten, 1993) which attempted to distin-
guish cases in which economic voting does and does 
not succeed at holding governments accountable through 
measures of “clarity of responsibility”, a concept de-
signed to capture institutional structures that allow 
voters to gather good information about the perfor-
mance of particular governmental actors. In the two 
decades since, Powell and Whitten’s finding that elec-
toral accountability obtains only under certain institu-
tional conditions has been followed by several studies 
reaching similarly restricted conclusions (Samuels, 2004; 
Zielinski, Slomczynski, & Shabad, 2005; Ebeid & Rod-
den, 2006; Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Hellwig & Samu-
els, 2008). Conditional findings have also emerged from 
studies focusing on voter psychology rather than insti-
tutions (Gomez & Wilson, 2006; Singer, 2010; Holbrook, 
Clouse, & Weinschenk, 2012). 
At the same time, studies claiming to confirm the 
efficacy of retrospective economic voting (Kelly, 2003; 
Rudolph, 2003; Bengtsson, 2004; Barreiro, 2007; Ge-
lineau, 2007; Alt, Bueno de Mesquita, & Rose, 2011) 
are far from insignificant either in number or in the 
geographic coverage of their datasets. These must be 
balanced against studies drawing conclusions of a skep-
tical character (Maravall, 2010; Alcaniz & Hellwig, 2011; 
Hellwig, 2012). Reviews of the literature range from the 
optimistic (Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2000) to the pes-
simistic (Anderson, 2007). The most recent review, 
covering both institutional and psychological facets of 
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the empirical literature, tends toward electoral skepti-
cism with its conclusion that “economic voting does 
not function as envisioned by advocates of democratic 
accountability” (Anderson, 2007, p. 271). Where does 
the balance of good evidence and sound interpretation 
lie? Both sides deserve a hearing. 
One of the earliest examples of electoral skepticism is 
an ambitious analysis of economic voting in all democra-
cies between 1950 and 1990 (Cheibub & Przeworski, 
1999). Using the survival of a government as the de-
pendent variable, Cheibub and Przeworski found that a 
wide range of economic variables had no significant ef-
fect. Only one variable related to unemployment had a 
modest positive effect on incumbent governments’ like-
lihood of staying in power. On the whole, what this sta-
tistical analysis suggests is that plenty of governments 
with bad economic records survive while plenty with 
good records do not. The original “clarity of responsibil-
ity” study (Powell & Whitten, 1993) is then replicated 
with new and expanded data to determine whether that 
variable could explain away such unaccountable cases. 
But the results were not positive even when isolating 
disciplined parliamentary regimes with high levels of 
clarity, operationalized by majority control over govern-
ment and high levels of party unity. In other words, de-
spite the intuition that rational citizens judge politicians 
on past economic performance, the likelihood that an 
incumbent government survived a re-election bid did not 
show up as systematically determined by economic con-
ditions during its tenure. 
The key to Cheibub and Przeworski’s analysis is two-
fold: its unusually broad geographic and chronologic scope 
and its use of the survival of a government in office as 
the dependent variable (Maravall, 2010, p. 91). Few anal-
yses of economic voting as a process of accountability 
appear to have used a similar operationalization of the 
dependent variable (i.e. electoral survival rather than vote-
share, vote-choice, or approval rating) since 1999. One 
uses a similarly large dataset and reports a generally 
negative accountability result (Maravall, 2010), while an-
other conducts a single-country, single-decade study and 
reports a conditional result (Zielinski, Slomczynski, & Sha-
bad, 2005). Of the remaining seventeen studies cited 
above which have appeared in the same period, two 
(Samuels, 2004; Barreiro, 2007) explicitly criticize the 
choice of survival of government as the dependent vari-
able. Since there is a wide variety of measurement op-
tions that bear not only on economic voting but also on 
other types of study yet to be considered, a fuller con-
sideration of the methodological issues must be post-
poned until Section 4. 
Table 1. Illustrative results for electoral accountability by topical area. 
 POSITIVE MIXED NEGATIVE 
ECONOMIC VOTING Rudolph 2003,  
Alt et al. 2011 
Bengtsson 2004,*  
Samuels 2004,  
Duch & Stevenson 2008 
Maravall 2010,  
Hellwig 2012 
CORRUPTION Ferraz & Finan 2008 Lederman et al. 2005, 
Tavits 2007a, Chang et al. 2010 
Pereira et al. 2009 
CONGRUENCE Erikson et al. 2002,  
Jones 2011 
Canes-Wrone & Shotts 2004, 
Tavits 2007b 
Lee et al. 2004,  
Gilens 2012 
Table 2. Illustrative results for electoral accountability by choice of dependent variable. 
 POSITIVE MIXED NEGATIVE 
OPINION DATA Rudolph 2003, 
Ansolabehere & Jones 2010 
Gelineau 2007,* 
Singer 2010* 
Alcaniz & Hellwig 2011 
VOTE-CHOICE Ansolabehere & Jones 2010, 
Jones 2011 
Gomez & Wilson 2006,* 
Gelineau 2007,* 
Holbrook et al. 2012 
 
VOTE-SHARE Barreiro 2007,  
Jones 2010 
Bengtsson 2004,* 
Hellwig & Samuels 2008, 
Kassow & Finocchiaro 2011 
Hellwig 2012 
ELECTORAL SURVIVAL Ferraz & Finan 2008 Zielinski et al. 2005, 
Chang et al. 2010 
Pereira et al. 2009, 
Maravall 2010 
ANTICIPATORY BEHAVIOR Erikson et al. 2002, 
Alt et al. 2011 
Snyder & Stromberg 2010, 
Ferraz & Finnan 2011, 
Gasper & Reeves 2011 
Lee et al. 2004, 
Gilens 2012 
NOTE: For the purposes of Tables 1 and 2, I have relied primarily on authors’ own introductory and concluding remarks to characterize their findings about 
accountability as “positive,” “mixed,” or “negative.” However, in several cases where introductory or concluding remarks suggest a positive finding while 
remarks within the body of the analysis suggest significant conditions or weaknesses in the results, I have classified that finding as “mixed”; such cases are 
marked by an asterisk in both tables. 
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The most direct challenge to Cheibub and Przewor-
ski’s pessimistic conclusions has found a conditional 
accountability result in a single-country study using a 
similar dependent variable (Zielinski, Slomczynski, & 
Shabad, 2005). Poland’s legislative elections feature 
multi-member districts with open candidate lists. Un-
like Cheibub and Przeworski, Zielinski and colleagues 
focus on purely electoral dynamics and do not include 
non-electoral losses of office through term limits or 
cabinet reorganization in their analysis. Over four suc-
cessive elections in the 1990’s, they found that mem-
bers of a governing coalition with poor economic per-
formance (as measured by rising unemployment) were 
systematically less likely to win re-election (2005, pp. 
380-384). But there is a striking condition attached to 
this result: electoral accountability was effective only 
with respect to those politicians who failed to wash 
their hands of the situation by switching parties before 
the next election (2005, pp. 385-390). On average, one 
out of every three incumbents running for re-election 
did so under a different party label from the previous 
election (2005, pp. 376-379). Politicians’ ability to ex-
ploit misleading partisan cues to avoid electoral sanc-
tion may be less of a hindrance to accountability in 
strong-party systems. 
The most general problem with economic-voting 
studies as efforts to confirm electoral accountability 
empirically is that they are often theoretically ham-
pered by the use of economic proxies both for public 
opinion on the front end of the causal chain (good 
times mean happy citizens) and for responsive policy 
on the back end (good times mean deserving incum-
bents). This kind of research design is more suggestive 
than rigorous. Precise, separate analyses of the vote-
sanction and sanction-policy linkages would be neces-
sary to confirm the causal story of accountability and 
thereby rule out non-economic explanations. 
As it happens, the most thorough recent analysis of 
economic voting (Duch & Stevenson, 2008) redresses 
this limitation of the classic research design by directly 
measuring citizens’ economic perceptions rather than 
letting economic outcomes stand as a proxy for them, 
promising a more precise picture of the beginning of 
the causal chain of accountability. The trade-off is that 
the vote-sanction linkage is the object of study here, 
with no effort to measure the sanction-policy linkage, 
making this a limited yet worthwhile perspective on 
accountability. Results from this multi-national analysis 
indicate that voters’ economic perceptions are more 
strongly associated with changes in parties’ vote-share 
in “closed” economies than “open” ones. The authors’ 
conclusion is that voters are rational, and that their 
relative inability to sanction policy-makers in open 
economies is the fault of complex structures of eco-
nomic decision-making rather than of elections them-
selves. This might be read as a qualified defense of elec-
toral accountability, except that the authors themselves 
explicitly dismiss a sanction model for explaining elec-
toral behavior in favor of a selection model in which vot-
ers are uninterested in rewarding or punishing past per-
formance (Duch & Stevenson, 2008, pp. 10-14, 28). 
Even when considered apart from such interpretive 
ambiguities, Duch and Stevenson’s finding of condi-
tional results for the existence of economic voting it-
self—the word “condition” even appears in the subtitle 
of the book—must be considered in light of a nearly 
simultaneous review of the economic-voting literature 
(Anderson, 2007). One concern there is that partisan-
ship may contaminate voters’ economic judgments 
(Anderson, 2007, 279-281; see also Marsh & Tilley, 
2010); another is that institutional “clarity of responsi-
bility” may prove too formidable a prerequisite for ac-
countability, given voters’ informational deficits (An-
derson, 2007, 282-285). Thus, the finding of conditional 
results even when voters are assumed to have perfect 
information (Duch & Stevenson, 2008, pp. 227-228) 
actually bears the logical implication of further restrict-
ing the real-world scope of accountability. I will address 
additional concerns about the choice of vote-share as 
the dependent variable in Section 4. 
Economic performance would seem to hold unique 
promise as an issue on which voters should have a rela-
tively easy time of gathering information and uniting 
around stable criteria of judgment. This psychological 
assumption about economic issues has sometimes been 
qualified or called into question (Singer, 2010; Alcaniz & 
Hellwig, 2011; Holbrook, Clouse, & Weinschenk, 2012), 
but few other political issues hold as much promise for 
yielding to widely shared norms of electoral judgment. 
Whether economic voting exists is a question that must 
be decoupled from how it functions—as a vehicle of ac-
countability, or not (see Anderson, 2007, pp. 289-290). 
Therefore the relative weakness, or strong conditionality, 
of the empirical results in this area remains a corner-
stone of the case for electoral skepticism. 
3.2. Corruption 
Pecuniary malfeasance by governmental agents is simi-
lar to economic hardship in its presumed ability to 
unite voters around common evaluative standards. 
Despite the possibility that some voters may benefit 
from corruption, the issue in general does not seem to 
suffer from complexities of identifying means-ends 
relationships and assigning responsibility to the extent 
that issues of economic policy-making do. These intui-
tions, at any rate, make studies of political corruption 
enticing to scholars interested in observing how far 
electoral accountability obtains when cognitive obsta-
cles among voters can be overcome. If they cannot turn 
thieves out of office, after all, what else could elections 
be good for? 
The standard research design for corruption studies 
differs from that for economic-voting studies. Instead 
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of analyzing electoral outcomes over time as the de-
pendent variable, corruption studies tend to use politi-
cal institutions (including electoral processes) as inde-
pendent variables in order to test their influence cross-
sectionally on corruption-related outcomes (Adsera, 
Boix, & Payne, 2003; Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005; 
Lederman, Loayza, & Soares, 2005; Tavits, 2007a). The 
consistent finding has been that electoral democracies 
systematically have lower levels of corruption, and 
electoral accountability serves as one of the assumed 
causal mechanisms: voters don’t like corruption, and 
periodic elections enable them to prevent it. More spe-
cifically, parliamentary regimes have been found to 
have systematically less corruption than presidential 
regimes (Kunicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005; Lederman, 
Loayza, & Soares, 2005). At the same time, single-seat 
elections tend to do better than proportional represen-
tation, and open-list tends to do better than closed-list 
proportional representation (Kunicova & Rose-
Ackerman, 2005). Significant results for press freedom 
(Lederman, Loayza, & Soares, 2005) and newspaper 
circulation (Adsera, Boix, & Payne, 2003) suggest the 
importance of good information for reducing corrup-
tion. Within European states, certain institutional fac-
tors of “clarity of responsibility” (i.e. governments con-
trolled by a single party over a relatively long period of 
time, with little or no influence over policy by opposi-
tion parties) make a significant difference in reducing 
corruption (Tavits, 2007a). 
The central difficulty with such studies is the weak-
ness or absence, sometimes freely admitted (e.g. Ku-
nicova & Rose-Ackerman, 2005, p. 598), of a causal 
story to explain the statistical results. It is a challenge 
to disentangle the myriad of institutions (e.g. federal-
ism) which may influence corruption-related outcomes. 
The fact that corruption seems to exist in inverse pro-
portion to the degree of the “personal vote,” falling 
from closed lists to open lists to single-member dis-
tricts, is suggestive of the “electoral connection” between 
constituents and uniquely identifiable representatives. On 
the other hand, no significant effect on corruption has 
been found with the imposition of term limits, which 
render some incumbents ineligible to run for re-election 
and thereby preclude the personal vote (Lederman, Lo-
ayza, & Soares, 2005). 
The bearing of corruption studies on electoral ac-
countability must remain highly speculative unless elec-
toral outcomes can be factored into the middle of the 
causal story, as economic-voting studies sometimes do. A 
few corruption studies have in fact taken this approach. 
An analysis of corruption trials in Italy and their effects 
on re-election bids, for example, has found that charges 
of corruption against incumbents made them less likely 
to win (Chang, Golden, & Hill, 2010). But this result has 
been interpreted by its authors as dependent on the 
“massive and thorough” media blitz that happened to 
accompany corruption scandals in Italy in the early 
1990’s (2010, pp. 215-216). In short, unusual circum-
stances of intense exposure seem to have been neces-
sary to activate the accountability function of elections. 
A similar approach has been taken with mayoral 
elections in Brazil, where a nationwide system of fiscal 
audits of municipal governments was introduced in the 
early 2000’s. Analysis of the actual re-election rates of 
incumbent mayors has showed that, compared to an 
average rate of 40%, the re-election chances of mayors 
who were charged with no violations rose to over 50% 
while those with three or more violations were only 
about half as successful (Ferraz & Finan, 2008). 
Since actual re-election is used as the dependent 
variable, with findings of corruption as an independent 
variable, the conceptual structure of this research de-
sign is similar to that of many economic-voting studies, 
at least for the vote-sanction linkage. Outcomes varia-
bles are used as a proxy for public opinion, and the 
main item of analysis is whether elections actually ap-
portion rewards and sanctions to incumbents accord-
ing to voters’ presumed will. Since the Brazilian audits 
were only announced in 2003, and the selection of tar-
gets was random, there was probably not enough no-
tice to justify testing responsiveness via anticipatory 
behavior by incumbents. In an effort to address the 
sanction-policy linkage, however, the same authors 
have found that in an earlier period re-eligible mayors 
were guilty of 27% less corruption than term-limited 
mayors in cities lacking locally based media (radio and 
newspapers) or active public prosecutors (Ferraz & 
Finan, 2011). There was no significant difference be-
tween re-eligible and ineligible mayors in cities enjoy-
ing these informational advantages or, rather puzzling-
ly, in those lacking a competitive political environment. 
Taken together, the two studies by Ferraz and Finan 
seem to complete the causal chain of electoral ac-
countability, from votes to sanctions to responsiveness. 
Some exponents of the “political economy” approach 
to electoral accountability have sanguinely cited these 
results as confirmation that repeated elections can be 
vehicles of democratic accountability if only the central 
problem of voter information can be overcome (Pande, 
2011, pp. 227, 234; Ashworth, 2012, p. 195). 
One problem with the Brazilian-audit studies, how-
ever, is familiar from the economic-voting literature: 
using variables for policy outcomes as a proxy for pub-
lic opinion is inferior, in terms of causal-explanatory 
power, to studying the vote-sanction linkage more di-
rectly. The importance of assessing Brazilian voters’ 
attitudes toward municipal corruption is heightened by 
the fact (unnoticed by some reviewers) that a replica-
tion of the earlier of the two Brazilian studies has found 
contrary results. When the vote-sanction linkage was 
examined on the basis of a different portion of the vast 
audit data, incumbent mayors charged with fiscal im-
proprieties appeared systematically more likely both to 
run for re-election and to win (Pereira, Melo, & 
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Figueiredo, 2009). The replication data differed in sev-
eral respects: it came from audits of all cities in a single 
state rather than a random sample from around the 
country; was based on comprehensive audits of munic-
ipal budgets rather than partial audits of municipal 
spending of federal funds only; and was analyzed with 
control variables for campaign spending, pork-barrel 
projects (as distinct from illegal expenses), and partisan 
affiliation (2009, p. 742). These technical discrepancies 
do not obviously favor one or the other study, on the 
whole. Thus the possibility that some combination of 
politicians’ skills and voters’ preferences may have de-
fied the expectations of rational-choice theory calls for 
more focussed analysis. 
Even if we ignore the negative accountability find-
ings of the Brazilian replication, the Italian study offers 
a skeptical hint about how to interpret the results of 
the original Brazilian study in terms of the broader em-
pirical regularities of democratic elections. Chang and 
colleagues’ quantitative results are broadly similar to 
Ferraz and Finan’s: incumbents suspected of corruption 
are significantly but not overwhelmingly less likely 
(slightly under 10% in Italy, somewhat over 10% in Bra-
zil) to win re-election. Yet the Italian study’s conclusion 
is that the informational circumstances leading to a 
statistically significant finding of electoral sanction 
were exceptional and rare (Chang, Golden, & Hill, 2010, 
p. 216: “if our interpretation is correct, it does not 
bode well for political accountability in established 
democracies”), whereas the Brazilian study’s conclusion 
is more categorical, theoretical, and optimistic (Ferraz & 
Finan, 2008, p. 706: “our paper lends strong support to 
the value of information and the importance of local 
media in promoting political accountability”). 
Is there something magical about the 10% threshold 
(in likelihood of re-election) crossed by the Brazilian 
study? More likely, both interpretations are correct at 
the same time: a modest measure of electoral account-
ability is possible under conditions of exceptionally 
good information. If evidence like this is considered 
“strong support” for the principal-agent theory of elec-
toral accountability (Ashworth, 2012, p. 198), the rea-
son may be that this theory already predicts a highly 
restricted range of circumstances under which account-
ability could in principle obtain in the real world. The 
most thorough of recent explorations of the principal-
agent perspective on electoral accountability con-
cludes, in conspicuously diplomatic fashion, that “it is 
less than clear whether the weight attached to the im-
portance of elections in modern representative democ-
racies would emerge from this approach” (Besley, 
2006, p. 99). 
3.3. Congruence 
Studies of economic voting and political corruption 
typically aspire to cover the entire length of the chain 
of electoral accountability by focusing on issue areas in 
which outcomes variables can simultaneously serve as 
proxies for public opinion, by dint of the presumption 
of voters’ homogeneous orientations toward those 
outcomes. In other issue areas, scholars have attempt-
ed to establish correlations between public opinion and 
policy outcomes through more precise and subtle 
measures of responsiveness, or “congruence” with vot-
ers. These measures typically involve comparing constit-
uents’ survey responses with representatives’ behavior 
on various policy domains after both are aggregated on a 
common ideological (usually left-right) scale. 
A great deal of research of this kind has been con-
ducted in American politics, often with very positive 
conclusions about representatives’ congruence (e.g. 
Erikson, MacKuen, & Stimson, 2002). Yet there is con-
siderable disagreement about the basic relationship 
between voters and policies, even before we reach the 
causal question about electoral sanctions in between. 
On one hand, several recent studies have reported pos-
itive results for electoral accountability by demonstrat-
ing congruence under circumstances favorable to im-
puting periodic elections as a cause. Historical studies 
of the U.S. Senate have found that senators became 
more closely aligned with ordinary voters after direct 
popular elections replaced selection by state legisla-
tures (Meinke, 2008; Gailmard & Jenkins, 2009), using a 
broad-gauged conception of congruence which spans 
multiple issue areas. A narrower study of U.S. presi-
dents’ budget policies has found them to become sys-
tematically congruent with public opinion under two 
conditions: the president must be in the last two years 
of his first term and must have approval ratings that 
are neither unusually high nor unusually low (Canes-
Wrone & Shotts, 2004). Data collected outside the U.S. 
have shown varying but appreciable levels of left-right 
congruence, more convincingly in the long run than 
when seen election by election (McDonald, Mendes, & 
Budge, 2004; Budge, Keman, McDonald, & Pennings, 
2012), as well as reciprocal responsiveness between 
public policy and public opinion on highly salient fiscal 
issues (Wlezien & Soroka, 2012). 
Elsewhere within the congruence literature, some 
studies have turned up more limited or partial forms of 
congruence and have harbored doubts about the pre-
sumed efficacy of electoral processes as causative of 
ideological or policy outcomes. A recent analysis of 
American national politics, disaggregated into several 
different policy areas, has found little systematic con-
gruence with the vast majority of citizens who do not 
belong to economic or interest-group elites (Gilens, 
2012, pp. 70-123). Another recent assessment found 
only “mixed evidence” for the linkage between elec-
toral sanctions and responsive policy in the American 
context (Grimmer, 2013, p. 624). Comparative research 
on responsiveness could also explore this causal issue 
directly. 
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Some elections scholars have responded to these 
mixed results by scaling back the causal-interpretive 
ambitions of their studies, retreating from the sanc-
tion-policy linkage and isolating the vote-sanction link-
age. One study of this type has found that congruence 
between voters’ policy preferences and their percep-
tions of candidates’ policy preferences bears a stronger 
systematic relation to individual vote-choice than do 
actual policy outcomes (Jones, 2011). For politicians, 
position-taking is more important to re-election than 
actual policy (2011, pp. 779-780). If voters are not get-
ting the kind of responsive policy that the theory of 
electoral accountability (at its most ambitious) aspires 
to, they at least believe themselves to be rewarding 
politicians for similar preferences and punishing them 
for discrepant preferences (Ansolabehere & Jones, 2010, 
p. 589). As we will see below (in Section 4), this kind of 
analysis must be evaluated in terms of the suitability of 
its variables for capturing the vote-sanction linkage. 
Congruence studies face a number of challenges as 
contributions to research on electoral accountability. 
Despite their generally positive quantitative results in 
studies of the United States, there is still a problem of 
causal relevance: congruence may have non-electoral 
causes, after all. For instance, politicians may be induc-
ing voters to become congruent rather than vice versa 
(Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000, pp. 44-70), as even electorally 
optimistic studies recognize (Ansolabehere & Jones, 
2010, p. 593). A related problem is the empirical reality 
of widespread voter ignorance about public affairs, 
even in relatively affluent and educated societies (Har-
din, 2000). An important methodological lesson imme-
diately follows from this fact: researchers investigating 
congruence between voters and politicians (e.g. An-
solabehere & Jones, 2010; Jones, 2011) should avoid 
using opinion data from opt-in surveys, which tend to 
have a selection bias toward better informed members 
of society. A further methodological problem is that a 
focus on roll-call position-taking (e.g. Bovitz & Carson, 
2006; Gailmard & Jenkins, 2009) can make it difficult to 
detect the influence of special interests on policy be-
tween one election and the next, since many important 
policy benefits are actually distributed in less visible 
ways, such as legislative amendments and regulatory 
directives (Fellowes & Wolf, 2004). 
Congruence studies can be an important adjunct to 
studies of electoral accountability in the narrow sense, 
since the former tend to investigate the responsiveness 
of policy at the end of the chain of representation. But 
optimistic results for that end of the chain can reveal 
little about the rest of the chain in the absence of addi-
tional study or careful causal analysis. 
4. Conceptual and Measurement Issues 
Part of the difficulty in evaluating empirical tests of 
electoral accountability lies in the variety of operation-
al schemes used to measure the dependent variable. 
Among the numerous studies that have appeared to 
vindicate electoral accountability, relatively few have 
directly challenged the most skeptical economic-voting 
studies (Cheibub & Przeworski, 1999; Maravall, 2010) 
by using measures similar to electoral survival. Scholars 
of electoral accountability must be careful to distin-
guish the stronger from the weaker operational meth-
ods, and above all to ensure that interpretations of 
their results bear a reasonable relation to the concep-
tual rationale behind their variables of choice. I will 
now review, in ascending order of plausibility, the main 
options for operationalizing the dependent variable. 
4.1. Approval Ratings and Vote-Choice 
The least plausible option in empirical analyses of elec-
toral accountability is to use approval ratings of parties 
or politicians as the dependent variable. Numerous 
studies of public opinion appear to rest on the assump-
tion that studying the background conditions of voter 
psychology is as good as studying the entire causal 
chain of electoral accountability. Their implicit logic is 
that, if public opinion can be shown to vary in rational 
and expected ways with changes in certain policies or 
policy outcomes, that systematic relation is proof of 
accountability. Of course this logic is incomplete with-
out further empirical investigation of the vote-sanction 
linkage between public opinion and electoral out-
comes. Despite the fact that this methodological prob-
lem has long been recognized (see Lewis-Beck & Steg-
maier, 2000, p. 188; Powell, 2004, p. 103), studies con-
tinue to be published purporting to test the existence 
of electoral accountability by way of approval ratings 
(Kelly, 2003; Rudolph, 2003; Singer, 2010). The value of 
such analyses hinges on their role of illuminating a sin-
gle node (i.e. voter psychology) of a single linkage in 
the chain of accountability (e.g. Alcaniz & Hellwig, 
2011; Holbrook, Clouse, & Weinschenk, 2012). 
A similar caution applies to other types of data from 
opinion surveys, such as self-reported voting. Vote-
choice at the individual level is better than approval 
ratings because it at least takes a step toward electoral 
behavior, and several studies have used this as the de-
pendent variable in order to test the existence of elec-
toral accountability (Gomez & Wilson, 2006; Gelineau, 
2007; Ansolabehere & Jones, 2010; Jones, 2011). But 
the well-known perils of relying on voters’ self-reported 
behavior (see Burden, 2000) leave considerable room 
for error. Data collected before an election about 
whom an individual voter plans to support seem little 
better than approval ratings, and data collected after 
an election about whom an individual reportedly sup-
ported are subject to bias and rationalization. Scholars 
have been at loggerheads over which form of reported 
vote-choice, ex ante or ex post, is less bad (see Gomez 
& Wilson, 2007, p. 57; Godbout & Belanger, 2007). Yet 
 Politics and Governance, 2014, Volume 2, Issue 2, Pages 13-27 21 
some consensus may be possible: both should be 
equally avoided when the vote-sanction linkage is at 
issue. 
4.2. Vote-Share 
A more justifiable approach is to use changes in the 
share of votes earned by a party or candidate from one 
election to the next as the dependent variable. As long 
as a given election can be verified as free from error 
and fraud, voting tallies have better validity as a meas-
ure of electoral behavior than reported vote-choice. 
Numerous studies investigating electoral accountability 
have used vote-share as the dependent variable (e.g. 
Bengtsson, 2004; Samuels, 2004; Ebeid & Rodden, 2006; 
Barreiro, 2007; Jones, 2010; Hellwig, 2012; see also 
Pande, 2011, pp. 227-228), including the most notable 
book-length treatment of economic voting in recent 
years (Duch & Stevenson, 2008), and this practice has 
been called the “standard approach” (Hobolt & Hoy-
land, 2011, p. 488) to operationalizing electoral ac-
countability. Yet scholars rarely consider the validity of 
vote-share data, and the paucity of mechanisms for 
verifying electoral processes (and the voting tallies to 
which they give rise) is a critical defect for not only po-
litical but also scholarly practice. 
Even if we could always verify the accuracy of elec-
toral results, the use of vote-share data would still 
force a conceptual mismatch onto electoral accounta-
bility. The problem, simply, is that losing votes is neces-
sary but not sufficient for electoral failure (or not even 
necessary, for coalition governments in parliamentary 
systems). If the economy is bad, for instance, even an 
incumbent politician’s grandmother could predict that 
some voters will desert her favored candidate (hence 
the insistence that political scientists strive to pass “the 
grandmother test”; see Shapiro, 2005, ch. 2). The rele-
vant questions for politicians are, how many deserters 
are likely and how might they be off-set? The answers 
may vary considerably according to circumstances, as 
college instructors who are subject to course evalua-
tions by students are aware. We can guess which poli-
cies or actions in the classroom may produce a notice-
able increase or decrease in evaluation scores at the 
end of the semester, yet we do not necessarily act as 
though any incremental change amounts to an effec-
tive sanction—it depends on our departments’ or uni-
versities’ particular institutions and personalities. By a 
similar logic, researchers are not entitled to infer the 
existence of electoral accountability from vote-share 
analysis alone. What matters is the sanction, which 
comes from actual electoral victory or defeat. After all, 
the selective pressures of competitive elections place a 
premium on deft and less than risk-averse politicians 
who can convert a hemorrhaging of votes due to bad 
policy outcomes into an electorally inconsequential 
trickle (Maravall, 1999, pp. 172-191). 
It is emblematic of what is at stake in the choice of 
dependent variable that a less pessimistic account of 
electoral accountability than the analysis of Cheibub 
and Przeworski (1999), but appearing in the same edit-
ed collection, opts for vote-share (Stokes, 1999). This 
study of Latin American presidential elections from 
1982 to 1995 found that incumbents who flagrantly 
betrayed major campaign pledges could compensate 
expected losses through good economic performance. 
In one sense, it should be good news for electoral ac-
countability that presidents who switched to their op-
ponents’ economic policies normally cost their party 
around 9% of vote-share at the next election, or that 
good economic results from such switches normally 
reversed that loss and produced a more than 2% gain 
in vote-share (1999, 115-116). But the very fact that 
politicians can neutralize one voting bloc with another, 
through policy outcomes over which they may or may 
not have control, illustrates the general principle that 
vote-share analysis cannot capture the existence of an 
effective sanction. Politicians operate in specific con-
texts with an eye toward ultimate victory or defeat, 
and that dichotomous result is where any sanction 
must come from. 
4.3. Electoral Survival 
The next step, then, would be to use actual re-election 
or loss of office as the dependent variable. This is relat-
ed to the concept of “survival in office” or, in time-
series analysis, “hazard rate” (Cheibub & Przeworski, 
1999). Only a few studies have taken this methodologi-
cal option, and most of them have sounded a pessimis-
tic note about electoral accountability. On the subject 
of economic voting, the most recent example of a long-
range, cross-national study has found that several eco-
nomic variables are related to survival in office either 
weakly or not at all (Maravall, 2010), while a single-
decade, single-country study has found that members 
of an incumbent governing coalition were less likely to 
win re-election during hard times unless they switched 
parties before the election (Zielinski, Slomczynski, & 
Shabad, 2005). On the subject of political corruption, a 
single-election study of Brazilian mayors has found a 
modest level of accountability by using electoral sur-
vival as the dependent variable (Ferraz & Finan, 2008), 
though these results have been disputed (Pereira, Me-
lo, & Figueiredo, 2009), while a long-range study of 
Italian parliamentary elections has found significant 
results with similar measures only during two years of 
unusually intensive media coverage of corruption 
(Chang, Golden, & Hill, 2010). All in all, the use of actu-
al re-election as the dependent variable has been ra-
ther rare and has tended toward the conclusion that 
periodic elections are weak or exceptional as political 
mechanisms of reward and punishment. 
The logic behind using survival in office as the de-
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pendent variable, that the actual loss of power is what 
motivates incumbent representatives and parties to 
govern responsively, has been directly challenged. The 
twofold criticism includes (a) the observation that using 
incremental changes in vote-share is more apt to show 
significant results in statistical analysis, coupled with 
(b) the assertion that politicians should be responsive 
to vote-share regardless of electoral outcomes (Samu-
els, 2004, pp. 425-426). The first point carries the impli-
cation that variables are to be chosen according to 
their propensity to yield statistically significant coeffi-
cients rather than conceptually coherent interpreta-
tions thereof. The second point only begs the underly-
ing conceptual question about how the electoral sanc-
tion is supposed to work on politicians. 
There is scope, nonetheless, for legitimate criticism 
of survival in office as a measure of electoral accounta-
bility. For one thing, the expiration of a coalition gov-
ernment in a parliamentary system is often not a result 
of electoral processes, as in cases where elected repre-
sentatives reshuffle a cabinet or form a new governing 
coalition (Maravall, 2010, pp. 82-83). Though the next 
elections would seem likely to figure in the calculations 
of the key players, the linking proposition necessary to 
the logic of accountability—that elite machinations in 
coalition formation are systematically responsive to 
anticipated voter behavior—would require separate 
analysis to establish the relevance of survival in office 
to the theory of electoral accountability in such cases. 
Empirical data so far suggest that partisan elites’ mo-
tives for making or unmaking governments are not 
closely aligned with voters’ (2010, pp. 93-98). Using 
survival in office as the dependent variable may sensi-
tize us to the important fact that loss of office may hap-
pen through non-electoral means, but for that very rea-
son this operational technique offers limited purchase 
on the workings of elections themselves. Electoral sur-
vival, narrowly speaking, is therefore preferable. 
A second problem involves term limits, which may 
function to limit electoral accountability in presidential 
regimes (or in single-seat elections generally) in a man-
ner similar to party-elite machinations in parliamentary 
regimes (or in multi-seat elections). Indeed Cheibub 
and Przeworski (1999) acknowledged that their nega-
tive findings for economic voting may be in part ex-
plained by the fact that term-limited presidents may 
lose office despite excellent economic conditions and 
widespread voter approval. The classic theoretic argu-
ment is that any incumbent who is not running for re-
election cannot in principle be motivated by sanctions 
at the hands of voters (Manin, Przeworski, & Stokes, 
1999, p. 34n; Fearon, 1999, pp. 61-62). This logic about 
term limits is analytically straightforward; the empirical 
evidence is less robust, though generally supportive 
(Canes-Wrone & Shotts, 2004; Gelineau, 2007). Yet it is 
possible for voters to hold incumbent parties responsi-
ble for the conduct of individually term-limited mem-
bers of government who care about their party’s future 
prospects (Samuels, 2004, pp. 426, 429-430). In single-
seat elections, then, term limits should not be consid-
ered a reason to dispense with survival in office as a 
measure of electoral accountability without first con-
sidering the effects of partisan succession. 
Finally, the use of a dichotomous variable like elec-
toral survival presents certain difficulties for statistical 
analysis which might be ameliorated by substituting 
continuous data such as vote-share. Yet technical con-
siderations must be subordinate to the conceptual co-
gency of operational choices with respect to the re-
search question at hand, not the other way around. 
While vote-share data may be useful for a variety of 
electoral studies, they fall short of capturing the logic 
of sanction which lies at the heart of studies of ac-
countability. Thus survival in office is a better measure 
of accountability in terms of conceptual fit than ap-
proval ratings, reports of individual vote-choice, and 
changes in vote-share. If construed narrowly to mean 
success or failure at re-election, to the exclusion of 
inter-electoral shuffling among party leaders, electoral 
survival is better still. 
4.3. Anticipatory Behavior 
A key limitation remains for studies using electoral sur-
vival as the dependent variable: it covers the vote-
sanction linkage but not the sanction-policy linkage. To 
cover the second half of the causal chain, which re-
quires that elections induce responsiveness in repre-
sentatives, we must find ways to measure anticipatory 
behavior by elected officers which would be hard to 
explain in the absence of an effective institutionalized 
sanction. 
A number of studies have taken this sort of ap-
proach to electoral accountability, but there is an im-
portant distinction to be made between representa-
tives’ behavior and policy outcomes. The classic re-
search design of economic-voting studies, for instance, 
takes economic outcomes as proxies for responsive 
behavior. Given the danger that policy outcomes may 
have little to do with the actions of elected officers, this 
is an unsafe conceptual bet. Thus studies that focus on 
measuring policy outcomes, only in the service of a 
tacit attribution of responsiveness as the causal mech-
anism behind them (e.g. Alt, Bueno de Mesquita, & 
Rose, 2011), are not in fact shedding much light on the 
process of electoral accountability. At the same time, 
there is conceptual danger at the other extreme of 
measuring representatives’ behavior independently of 
outcomes. It is well known that position-taking can be 
a good strategy for concealing actual policy-making 
from imperfectly informed voters (Arnold, 1990, pp. 
119-120). In studies of legislative representation, for 
instance, analyzing roll-call voting (Meinke, 2008; 
Jones, 2011) can be a fool’s errand if actual policies and 
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policy outcomes are being shaped elsewhere. Repre-
sentatives may even work behind the scenes to subvert 
policies that their roll-call records show support for, or 
to promote policies that their roll-call records show 
opposition to (Hussey & Zaller, 2011, p. 337). Position-
taking, then, may be proof of elected officers’ belief in 
the power of publicity more than of their electorally 
enforced responsiveness—surely not a useless result, 
but one that falls well short of establishing the empiri-
cal existence of accountability. 
Researchers must therefore try to steer a middle 
course between representatives’ conduct and policy 
outcomes when analyzing the sanction-policy linkage. 
A recent example is provided by a study of the effects 
of variations in newspaper readership across districts of 
the U.S. House of Representatives which examined a 
range of official behaviors, the policy outcome of fed-
eral dollars spent within each district, and variables 
relating to public opinion (Snyder & Stromberg, 2010). 
This analysis has found that districts with lower news-
paper readership have systematically less knowledgea-
ble constituents, less active and independent repre-
sentatives, and lower federal spending within the dis-
trict. In short, the effect of political information on the 
front end of public opinion and the back end of respon-
sive policy is thoroughly covered, leaving only a closer 
study of the assumed causal mechanism of the electoral 
sanction to be examined in the middle of the chain. 
Research on disaster relief is another promising av-
enue for studying responsive government, for several 
reasons. Like promoting prosperity and reducing cor-
ruption, ameliorating the effects of natural disasters 
can serve as a fairly reliable proxy for public opinion: 
almost everyone likes it, barring principled libertarians 
or anarchists. Moreover, by operationalizing responsive 
policy as moneys spent, the interpretive traps of posi-
tion-taking and of autonomous or unintended policy 
outcomes may be avoided. One study of this kind 
among regional governments in India has found that 
disaster relief is systematically boosted by voter turn-
out, partisan electoral competition, and newspaper 
readership (Besley & Burgess, 2002). A study of Ameri-
can states has found that the generally negative effects 
(on vote-share) of natural disasters for incumbents can 
be compensated by gains for U.S. presidents and state 
governors who launch or support conspicuous relief 
efforts (Gasper & Reeves, 2011). Again, all that is miss-
ing from such studies is careful analysis of the electoral 
sanction itself (for instance, by abandoning vote-share 
as the dependent variable) to ensure that the interven-
ing causal mechanism between public opinion and re-
sponsive policy is actually completing the chain. 
Another strategy for measuring responsive behav-
ior, with similar difficulties in specifying electoral sanc-
tions as a causal mechanism, uses indicators of ideolog-
ical or policy congruence between constituents and 
representatives. As we have seen above, there is disa-
greement in the American context over the causal rela-
tion between voters and policies, and one study found 
“little evidence that members of the U.S. House alter 
their positions” for the sake of “the probability of win-
ning election” (Lee, Moretti, & Butler, 2004, p. 848). An 
aspect of the question which seems well settled, how-
ever, involves variation in responsiveness in different 
phases of the electoral cycle. In other words, respon-
siveness kicks in when an elected officer is anticipating 
a close contest for re-election in the near future. The 
eleventh-hour nature of responsiveness is long estab-
lished and amply documented. A study of elected judg-
es in American states has found a similar end-of-term 
effect (Huber & Gordon, 2004) in which harsher sen-
tences for convicted criminals are handed down, pre-
sumably in the expectation that American voters will 
reward such conduct if they can remember it on elec-
tion day. As the disaster-relief study has noted, voters 
are generally inattentive except in the run-up to an 
election (Gasper & Reeves, 2011). Difficulty of recall 
leads voters to weight recent information much more 
heavily than information about earlier periods of a rep-
resentative’s term (Huber, Hill, & Lenz, 2012), which 
may explain why politicians often wait until just prior 
to election day to engage in deviant behavior resem-
bling responsiveness (Jacobs & Shapiro, 2000, pp. 43-44). 
The end-of-term effect authorizes a strong pre-
sumption that representatives are behaving respon-
sively because of the imminent possibility of electoral 
sanction, since it would be difficult to explain in the 
absence of such a sanction. Yet studies of last-minute 
responsiveness also imply that the sanction is less than 
fully operative most of the time, supporting the theory 
of electoral accountability only with the addition of a 
significant proviso: “just before election day.” If “only 
the threat of imminent elections produces a temporary 
rise in responsiveness to public opinion” (Jacobs & 
Shapiro, 2000, p. xviii), responsiveness is abnormal. 
This empirical regularity suggests that electoral ac-
countability requires terms of office short enough to 
keep voters constantly on the watch. This considera-
tion does not invalidate the empirical results of the 
eleventh-hour studies, but it does qualify how we in-
terpret those results in terms of electoral accountabil-
ity as an empirical phenomenon. 
Analysis of anticipatory behavior is the best bet for 
investigating the sanction-policy linkage, but research-
ers must not forget the sanctioning node of the linkage 
and the need for causal analysis to make the chain 
hold. Responsiveness, at least under American condi-
tions, has been found to be deviant and temporary. 
This fact seems to reflect the importance of statecraft, 
of the ability of politicians to control rather than be 
controlled. Elections are a key part of the institutional 
environment and therefore an important tool in politi-
cians’ quest for control. 
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5. Conclusions 
How well do periodic elections perform as vehicles of 
democratic accountability? Based on my analysis of key 
empirical literatures in political science in the last cou-
ple of decades, set within a precise conceptual frame-
work that distinguishes two sections of the causal chain 
of accountability, the answer to this important ques-
tion is rather pessimistic. The most rigorous methods 
have tended to yield more skeptical results in recent 
years (see Table 2). Elections perform a variety of func-
tions in modern constitutional republics, but their ac-
countability anemia means that they cannot be a solu-
tion to “democratic deficits” in such republics without 
major alterations in institutional forms or practical cir-
cumstances. Though institutional variations have been 
theorized to make a large difference in electoral ac-
countability (e.g. Powell, 2000), the skeptical trend in 
empirical studies reviewed above encompasses both 
presidential and parliamentary regimes as well as both 
pluralitarian and proportional electoral systems, mak-
ing this key theoretic issue ripe for further study. 
My conclusions are difficult to square with some 
powerful and long-standing assumptions in political 
research. The “electoral connection” (see Mayhew, 
1974) between voters and politicians is a stock idea of 
both popular and scholarly discourse. It often serves as 
an implicit, untested assumption in constructing causal 
stories about, for example, why democratic states rare-
ly go to war with one another (e.g. Bueno de Mesquita, 
Morrow, Siverson, & Smith, 1999), tend to exhibit rela-
tively low levels of political corruption (e.g. Lederman, 
Loayza, & Soares, 2005), or yield any of a variety of 
other positive policy outcomes (e.g. Alt, Bueno de 
Mesquita, & Rose, 2011). Scholarly efforts at improving 
or “deepening” democracy usually revolve around elec-
toral institutions (e.g. Gerken, 2009). Even attempts to 
reconceive democratic accountability in explicitly non-
electoral terms continue to pay homage to the conven-
tional wisdom that repeated elections remain, none-
theless, accountability’s primary vehicle (e.g. Grant & 
Keohane, 2005, p. 41; Rubenstein, 2007, pp. 618-619). 
All these branches of political research could profit 
from a greater sense of realism about what elections 
have achieved in terms of popular control or democrat-
ic power. One normative implication is that non-
electoral options for empowering ordinary citizens vis-
a-vis political elites (see Maloy, 2008; McCormick, 
2011) should be high on the menu of institutional-
design responses to democratic deficits. 
Progress in empirical analysis may depend on heed-
ing two key lessons. First, we should observe the key 
distinction between the vote-sanction linkage and the 
sanction-policy linkage in pursuit of the kind of plausi-
ble causal explanations to which political research nat-
urally aspires. This distinction helps to clarify the con-
tributions of narrow-gauged studies of voter psycholo-
gy and policy outcomes within the scholarly division of 
labor, since they illuminate the far ends of the causal 
chain of accountability, while accentuating the im-
portance of more direct analysis of two kinds of causal 
process in the middle regions of the chain. Second, we 
should avoid operationalizing electoral accountability 
as a dependent variable in terms of approval ratings, 
individual vote-choice, or changes in vote-share—
though such variables may be useful in other types of 
research design, or in studies that are ancillary to elec-
toral accountability. When considering the vote-
sanction linkage we should favor actual electoral sur-
vival, and for the sanction-policy linkage we should 
emphasize anticipatory behavior. It may be that the 
forces that weaken or sever these linkages are not, on 
further inspection, as daunting as the scholarly trend of 
electoral skepticism suggests. But only a concerted 
effort to match an explicit conceptual framework with 
precise operational techniques could in principle con-
tribute to the progress of knowledge on these topics. 
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